This paper compares the expressive power of five languagebased access control models. We show that the expressive powers are incomparable between any pair of history-based access control, regular stack inspection and shallow history automata. Based on these results, we introduce an extension of HBAC, of which expressive power exceeds that of regular stack inspection.
Introduction
To protect secure information against malicious access, it is desirable to incorporate a runtime access control mechanism in a host language. This approach is called languagebased access control, and a few models have been proposed [1, 5, 6, 9] . A common feature of these models is that the history of execution such as method invocation and resource access is used for access control. Stack inspection provided in the Java virtual machine [6] is one of the bestknown such control mechanisms. In stack inspection, a set of permissions is assigned statically to each method and when the control reaches a statement for checking permissions, it is examined whether or not every method on the runtime stack has the permissions specified by the statement. Stack inspection has been extended in several ways. For example, stack pattern can be specified by LTL formula in [7] and regular language in [4, 8] . Automatic verification methods for a program with stack inspection are also discussed in [4, 7, 8] . Abadi and Fournet [1] pointed out the problem of stack inspection, which completely cancels the effect of the finished method execution. They proposed a new control mechanism called history-based access control (HBAC). In HBAC, current permissions are modified each time a method is invoked, and they may depend on all the methods executed so far. Verification of HBAC programs is also discussed in [2, 3, 10] . Meanwhile, Schneider [9] defines security automata, and later Fong [5] defines shallow history automata as a subclass of finite-state security automata. Fong showed that the expressive powers of shallow history automata and regular stack inspection are incomparable. However, the relations among the control models mentioned so far have not been fully clarified.
In this paper, we first define five of the existing control mechanisms in a simple and uniform framework based on control flow graph. Next, we introduce a trace equivalence relation among programs, and compare the expressive power of the five subclasses of programs. In particular, the expressive powers are incomparable between any pair of historybased access control, regular stack inspection and shallow history automata. Based on these results, we introduce an extension of HBAC, of which expressive power exceeds that of regular stack inspection.
Definitions

HBAC program
An HBAC program is a tuple π = (Mhd, f 0 , {G f | f ∈ Mhd}, PRM) where Mhd is a finite set of method names, f 0 ∈ Mhd is the main method name, G f ( f ∈ Mhd) is a control flow graph of f defined below and PRM is a finite set of
nop} is a labeling function for nodes, IT f ⊆ NO f is a set of initial nodes, which represents the set of entry points of method f , and SP f ⊆ PRM is a subset of permissions assigned to f before runtime (static permissions). NO f is divided into four subsets by IS f as follows.
•
Node n is a call node that represents a call to method g. Parameters P G and P A are called grant permissions and accept permissions, respectively.
• IS f (n) = return. Node n is a return node that represents a return to the caller method.
• IS f (n) = check [P] where P ⊆ PRM. Node n is a check node that represents a test for the current permissions.
• IS f (n) = nop. Node n is a nop node with no effect.
We write n → n for n,
In the figures in this paper, a dotted arrow denotes a transfer edge and a solid arrow connects between a call node and the initial node(s) of the callee method. Also, a method is surrounded by a rectangle and a set beside the rectangle denotes the static permissions of the method.
A state of π is a pair n, C of a node n ∈ NO and a subset of permissions C ⊆ PRM. A configuration of π is a finite sequence of states, which is also called a stack. The concatenation of state sequences ξ 1 and ξ 2 is denoted as ξ 1 : ξ 2 . The semantics of an HBAC program is defined by the transition relation ⇒ over the set of configurations, which is the least relation satisfying the following rules.
The rule of nop for the other program subclasses in the following subsections is the same as above and will be omitted below. For a configuration n 1 , C 1 : . . . : n , C , the stack top is n , C where n and C are called the current program point and the current permissions of the configuration, respectively. The trace set of π is defined as
where ε denotes the empty sequence. For a set S of sequences, let prefix(S ) denote the set of all nonempty prefixes of sequences in S .
Example 1.
Chinese wall policy is a policy such that a user has access permission to any resources, but once the user has accessed one of the resources, (s)he loses access permission to the resources belonging to competing parties. A simplified Chinese wall policy can be represented by program π in Fig. 1 . If the control reaches n 1A and n 1A calls A, then the current permissions lose permission p B . Thus, if n 2B calls B afterward, the check at m 0B fails. The same situation occurs when B and A are called in this order. In fact, [ 
where the argument of 'prefix' is specified by a regular expression and + denotes the union operator.
Figure 1 An HBAC program
JVM and R-SI programs
A program with Java stack inspection (abbreviated as JVM program) has a form
where each component of G f is the same as that of an HBAC program, except that the label IS f (n) of each call node n is simply call g (g ∈ Mhd) without P G or P A , and a set of privileged nodes PRV ⊆ NO is specified. The semantics of π is defined as follows. (The rule for check is the same as HBAC programs.) [4, 8] as an extension of a JVM program where
Its semantics is given by the following rules.
IS(n)
* is a regular language over NO. The trace set of a JVM or R-SI program is defined in the same way as that of an HBAC program except that current permissions are missing in R-SI.
F-SA and SHA Programs
A finite security automaton (F-SA) [9] is just a deterministic finite automaton (DFA) M = (Σ, Q, q 0 , δ) without final states where Σ is a finite set of input symbols, Q is a finite set of states, q 0 ∈ Q is the initial state and δ is a state transition function, which is a partial function from Q × Σ to Q. We
The semantics of an F-SA program is defined as follows.
Expressive Power
A program without check nodes, permissions or privileged nodes is called a basic program. Let α ∈ {HBAC, R-SI, JVM, F-SA, SHA}. An α program π is an extension of a basic program π 0 if π 0 is obtained from π by the following operations.
(S1) Delete each check node n (if α = HBAC, R-SI or JVM).
At the same time, for any pair of n 1 ∈ in(n) and n 2 ∈ out(n), add a transfer edge n 1 →n 2 . Moreover, if n ∈ IT f for some f ∈ Mhd, then add every n 2 ∈ out(n) into IT f .
(S2) Delete grant permissions and accept permissions from each call node (if α = HBAC).
(S3) Delete the designation of privileged nodes (if α = JVM).
(S4) (Optional) For a pair of call nodes n 1 and n 2 in method f such that IS(n 1 ) = IS(n 2 ) = call g , in(n 1 ) = in(n 2 ), out(n 1 ) = out(n 2 ) and either n 1 , n 2 ∈ IT f or n 1 , n 2 IT f , delete one node n 2 and leave the other node n 1 as it is. We call the deleted node n 2 a satellite of n 1 . This step can be repeated an arbitrary finite number of times; however, we constrain a node that has a satellite from being a satellite of another node, for consistency with later definitions.
Let sat(n) = { n | n = n or n is a satellite of n }. Satellite nodes can be used with check nodes for making grant permissions and accept permissions (resp. designation as a privileged node) depend on the current permissions in an HBAC (resp. JVM) program, as shown in Fig. 2 . An R-SI program can contain the same structure as Fig. 2 Figure 2 A call node n 1 and its satellites n 2 and n 3 from the stack bottom to n i matches R i . However, the fact that a prefix of the stack matches R i can be checked in other check nodes without using satellite nodes, and thus satellite nodes are useless in R-SI programs. On the other hand, without check nodes, satellite nodes are meaningless because in(n 1 ) = in(n 2 ) and out(n 1 ) = out(n 2 ) for a call node n 1 and its satellite n 2 , i.e., wherever n 1 appears in an execution sequence, n 2 can also appear regardless of context. Hence satellite nodes are meaningless in program models without check nodes, such as F-SA and SHA.
Let nc be a homomorphism over the set of nodes defined by nc(n) = n for a satellite node n of n , nc(n) = n for a return or call node n that is not a satellite of another node, and nc(n) = ε for a check or nop node n. For two programs π 1 and π 2 , we say that π 1 is trace equivalent to π 2 if they are extensions of a single basic program π 0 and nc
Let us denote the class of α programs by α. For classes of programs α and β, we write α β if for an arbitrary α program π 1 there is a β program π 2 trace equivalent to π 1 (we say that π 1 can be simulated by π 2 ). If α β, we also say that α can be simulated by β.
is reflexive and transitive. We write α β if α β does not hold. By definition, SHA F-SA. It is known that JVM R-SI [8] , R-SI SHA, SHA R-SI [5] and JVM HBAC [10] .
In the following theorems, we show that α β for any pair of program classes α, β other than SHA F-SA, JVM R-SI, and JVM HBAC. Intuitively, R-SI (and JVM) cannot simulate HBAC (Theorem 1) because an R-SI program completely cancels the effect of the finished method execution. R-SI cannot simulate F-SA and SHA for the same reason. F-SA (and SHA) cannot simulate JVM (and R-SI and HBAC) (Theorem 2) because an F-SA does not consider the stack and cannot decide whether the number of calls equals the number of returns. HBAC cannot simulate SHA (and F-SA) (Theorem 5) because an HBAC program cannot simulate a program where a call to some method g enables a call to another method h.
Theorem 1. HBAC R-SI.
Proof. Consider the HBAC program π 1 in Fig. 3 . When the control reaches s 0 , the current permissions contain p if 
Theorem 2. JVM F-SA.
Proof. The JVM program π 2 in Fig. 4 cannot be simulated by any F-SA program. At the beginning of the program, the current permissions equal SP f = ∅. However, when the privileged call node n 1 ∈ PRV calls n 0 , the current permissions become SP g = {p}. Hence when n 2 calls s 0 , the current permissions do not include p if and only if n 1 is not in the stack, i.e., n 1 has never been visited or every call at n 1 has returned. Therefore the trace set of π 2 is [[
). Suppose that there exists an F-SA program π 2 that simulates π 2 . The F-SA of π 2 must have a run (i.e. path from the initial state) for sequence g i (hhg) i−1 g for i ≥ 1 1 but must not have any run for g i (hhg) i−1 h. However, such a finite automaton never exists by the pumping lemma of regular languages. However, there is no such SHA because the state of an SHA just after reading g j for any j ≥ 1 is {g}, and thus the SHA has a run for g 2i h if it has a run for g 2i−1 h. Surprisingly, HBAC can simulate neither R-SI nor SHA.
Theorem 4. R-SI HBAC.
Proof. Consider the R-SI program π 4 in Fig. 6 . This program recursively calls n 0 arbitrary times, and then returns at n 3 if the call at n 1 was repeated an even number of times. Thus the trace set of + n 2i−1 1 ). Note that in an HBAC program, the current permissions alter only at a call and return. At the beginning of π 4 , the current permissions equal SP g . If the current permissions equal SP g at n 1 or n 1 's satellite in π 4 , then the current permissions just after the call at the node equal (SP g ∪ P G )∩SP g = SP g , where P G is the grant permissions of the node. Thus regardless of the number of calls at a node in sat(n 1 ), the current permissions remain SP g , and thus π 4 cannot distinguish between even and odd numbers of calls at the nodes in sat(n 1 ). 
Theorem 5. SHA HBAC
An Extended Model
An HBAC program cannot remove a permission from the current permissions unless it takes the intersection of the current permissions and the static permissions of a callee method. Thus, we extend HBAC by introducing a subset SET of NO (like PRV in a JVM program) such that if n ∈ NO f ∩ SET and IS(n) = call g [P G , P A ] in HBAC then n replaces the current permissions with P G before taking the intersection of the current permissions and the static permissions of g. We also extend HBAC so that the initial current permissions C 0 in the definition of the trace set can be an arbitrary subset of SP f 0 and is given as a component of an HBAC program. The syntax and semantics of the extended model, called sHBAC, are defined as follows.
PRM, SET, C 0 ).
• The semantic rules for an sHBAC program are the rules obtained from the original rules in Section 2.1 by replacing the first rule with the following two rules.
The definition of trace equivalence is the same as the one in Section 3 except that we add: (S3 ) Delete the designation of set nodes (nodes being in SET) if α = sHBAC.
Theorem 6. R-SI sHBAC
Proof. Let π = (Mhd, f 0 , {G f | f ∈ Mhd}) be an arbitrary R-SI program. At first, we consider a simple case in which π has only one check node n c . Assume that IS(n c ) = check [R] and R is specified by a DFA M R = (NO, Q, q 0 , F, δ), where Q = {q 0 , q 1 , . . . , q k } is a set of states, q 0 ∈ Q is the initial state, F ⊆ Q is a set of final states, and δ : Q × NO → Q is a state transition function. The alphabet of M R is the node set NO of π. We can construct an sHBAC program π = (Mhd, f 0 , {G f | f ∈ Mhd}, PRM, SET, C 0 ) that simulates π as follows. Define PRM = Q, SP f = PRM for all f ∈ Mhd, and C 0 = {q 0 }. For each f ∈ Mhd, the control flow graph G f is the same as G f except that each call node n is replaced with the structure shown in Fig. 8 and the check node n c is replaced with the structure shown in Fig. 9 . Define SET be the set of all call nodes in π . In an execution of π , the current permissions represent the state of M R for the current stack (except the topmost node; i.e., the current permissions equal the singleton { δ(. . . δ(δ(q 0 , m 1 ), m 2 ), . . . , m j−1 ) } if the stack equals m 1 m 2 . . . m j−1 m j ). The structure in Fig. 8 selects a call node n i corresponding to the current state q i of M R and n i sets the next state q i = δ(q i , n) of M R to the current permissions. The structure in Fig. 9 blocks the execution unless the current state of M R is a final state.
...
... Figure 8 Structure for replacing a call node in an R-SI program Figure 9 Structure for replacing a check node in an R-SI program
Consider the case in which π has more than one check nodes n c1 , . . . , n cm . Let M R be the product automaton of In the sHBAC program π in the proof of Theorem 6, the accept permissions of every call node in method f equal SP f . This means that the effect of finished method execution is canceled and thus the current permissions depend only on the current stack. We call the class of such restricted sHBAC programs sH-SI. By the proof of Theorem 6, R-SI sH-SI. Moreover, we can show sH-SI R-SI.
Theorem 7. sH-SI R-SI
Proof. For a given sH-SI program π = (Mhd, f 0 , {G f | f ∈ Mhd}, PRM, SET, C 0 ), consider a DFA M = (NO, 2 PRM , C 0 , F, δ) defined as follows. The alphabet of M is the node set NO of π, the state set is the power set of PRM, and the initial state is C 0 . For each call node n of π such that IS(n) = call g [P G , P A ] and each subset C ⊆ PRM, δ(C, n) = (C ∪ P G ) ∩ SP g if n SET and δ(C, n) = P G ∩ SP g if n ∈ SET. For any other node m and each subset C ⊆ PRM, δ(C, m) = C. The state of M after reading a node sequence σ represents the current permissions of π when the stack is σ. We can construct an R-SI program π that simulates π as follows. For each check node n such that IS(n) = check [P] , change the label to IS(n) = check [R] where the regular language R is given by a copy of M whose finial state set F is { C | P ⊆ C }.
Note that HBAC sHBAC by definition. SHA sHBAC since the proof of Theorem 5 remains valid for sHBAC.
Known results and new results are summarized in Fig. 10 . For any pair of program classes α, β, either α β or α β has been proved. In the figure, an arrow is omitted between program classes α and β if α β or α β can be implied by other relations. For example, R-SI JVM is implied by JVM HBAC and R-SI HBAC.
Conclusion
The expressive power of five subclasses of programs with access control was compared. In particular, the expressive powers are incomparable between any pair of history-based access control, regular stack inspection and shallow history automata. Based on these results, we introduced an extension of HBAC, of which expressive power exceeds that of regular stack inspection. It is left as a future study to clarify whether some composition of programs can simulate HBAC, for example, HBAC JVM × SHA and/or HBAC R-SI × F-SA.
